Against Universalism in Biosemiotic Theories

Abstract

The frontiers of biosemiotics are inconspicuously blurry. This is a feature and not a bug of the discipline in that it allows us to ask questions beyond certain boundaries, enriching both our knowledge beyond semiotic theories and the possibility of covering new ground through them. Yet, explanatory power should be something of a concern for biosemioticians looking to plant flags around different heights. The paths cleared by backwoodsmen should hold up to scrutiny, and in order for biosemioticians to examine these paths, some of the features of semiotic theory should work as reminders of what the aim of semiotic theory is.

This paper will explore one particular issue when it comes to building biosemiotic theories, namely, the idea that the semiotic comprises a universal and basal quality in a hierarchy of elements assumed to give rise to other, more complex things. The metatheoretical problem at its core will be defined as the unnecessary expansion of semiotic attributes in order to give them enough explanatory power to either provide semiotic theories of everything or give a semiotic basis to theories that do not, in principle, require it.