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Linguistic **Frontiers**

Doing Language(s) and Other Communicative Practices

Original Study

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Abstract: Enlanguaged practices bring together social semiosis working as an interfacial verge or axle for even greater domains of human existence. They have mental, bodily and communicative aspects, mingle with respective practices and thus bring them all together. 4E approaches to practices help to couple them. On the one hand embodying consolidates bodies and things while on the other enacting results in processes and practices. Linguistic bodies and things are shaped as nouns and nominal forms while processes and practices mold as verbs, predicatives and other rhematic formats.

Keywords: languaging, language games, mental, bodily and communicative practices, embodying and enacting, embedding and extending, prerequisites and outcomes, externalities and affordances.

Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst.
Martin Heidegger. Brief über den "Humanismus"[1]

Two idioms are the points of departure for the article. The first phrase is the title of the seminal volume "How to do things with words" (Austin 1962). It is reshaped into the title of the article on doing languages. The second one is an axiomlike claim by Martin Heidegger, "Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst" (Heidegger 1976, 326 .

The title of Austin's book sounds so straightforward and precise that it gives practically no chance to question it. Still, a narrow chance emerges with polysemy of the word *thing* or even an assortment of homophones *things*. Doing things implies both "making manufactured articles" and "performing actions" but may probably refer also to a dozen or so other kinds of activities. So, it is the author's purport to convert naïve (and ambiguous) statements about *what things do to other things by things again* into far more relevant accounts of *how you and me interact* with each other – and to this end with our common milieu to produce enhanced evolving of this mutual entirety of ours. What do we actually suggest when we say we are doing something? Is it literally *some thing* or an objective and clear-cur body? Or otherwise, can it be a process or an activity of some kind? What do we actually refer to after all – to the actual process of *doing* (*making*, *performing*) or only the *products* of our making or the *outcomes* of our endeavoring? A variety of responses to those questions make up a key

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section of the paper "Words and deeds or utterings and undertakings".

The epigraph from Heidegger provides another important hint. It gives us a chance to question what kind of *thing* we refer to when use the word *language*. Whether other words like *mother-tongue*, *speech*, *parlance*, *discourse* or *communication* are synonymous with it or/and provide alternatives? And most importantly if the *-ing* words like *languaging*, *speaking*, *talking*, *writing*, *interpreting*, *understanding* can also do, and probably do better. What can better serve the ends of our communicating and interacting with each other? Respective responses make up another key section of the paper.

WORDS AND DEEDS VERSUS UTTERINGS AND UNDERTAKINGS.

Most probably it is impossible to tell now who coined the phrase "How to do things with words". Probably it was the editor of the book James Urmson. It could be anyone else on the team working on the publication of 1962. It could be even John Austin himself albeit the remaining notes contain no sign of it. Anyway, it was a brilliant formulation focusing attention on the pragmatic effects of meaningful wordings. Pragmatically it was good for selling the book as well as for grasping the gist of its message. But this success was incomplete and poisoned by a fundamental flaw. The dictum rests on two nouns – things and words while in the lectures and the book of 1962 the focus is on wording and doing[2]. The first noun covers the 'objective' realm of the reified external world. The second one addresses the verbal tokens of human activity and not its entire 'subjective' domain. Both agentive ing-forms are present participles or gerunds.

Such a distinction is vital to Austin. But he is far more subtle and actually doubles distinctions in his lectures. An internal, personalized and subjectivized distinction of mental and verbal actions, *words vs. thoughts* is complemented by an externally entangled and objectivized opposition of human actions and their worldly outcomes, *acts vs. things*.

John Austin identifies the problem right at the very beginning of his first lecture, "The phenomenon to be discussed is very widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been already noticed, at least here and there, by others. Yet I have not found attention paid to it specifically" (Austin 1962, 1).

Actually, Austin's perspective is the phenomenal one and not that of separate 'things' and thing-like 'acts'. He tries to avoid as much as possible damaging reductions. Philosophers and grammarians reduce *the actual human phenomenon*, sketched in the Chef d'œuvre by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, either to descriptive *statements* or *sentences*. Austin himself broadens such a personalized reduction by focusing on utterances of various types and their pragmatic effects. But it is only an incipient improvement. All other ongoing activity with the overall developmental evolving still remains overlooked.

John Austin clarifies his approach to distinctions already in footnote 1 at the bottom of the very first page of the text, "It is, of course, not really correct that a sentence ever *is* (italicized by Austin – *M.I.*) a statement: rather, it is *used* (italicized by Austin – *M.I.*) in *making a statement* (italicized by Austin – *M.I.*), and the statement itself is a 'logical construction' out of the *makings* (italicized by myself, please note the unfortunate nominalization of the −ing form in the plural – *M.I.*) of statements" (Austin 1962, 1).

It is remarkably important that Austin shifts attention from the reified objects ('things') to processes of producing those objects ('doings'). Thus, "the statement itself is a 'logical construction' out of the makings of statements". In other words, 'the statement itself" is nothing but a result of the process or practice 'of the making of statement'. While 'making of statement' is an inclusive and comprehensive phenomenon, any of the statements made are only its results in the form of 'logical construction'.

Anyway, Austin's purport is to redevelop the straightforward presentation of research objects as 'things' into far more appropriate and valid interpretations of what actually happens when our *ongoing* practices of *doing* and *thinking* something are *facilitated* and *embodied* with 'words'. All other 'deeds' including unverbalized and encoded practices – spontaneous, intuitive, subconscious or conventionally automated – are also implied.

What do we actually suggest when we say we are doing something – "a thing of some type" or "something we call a thing"? Do we assume that the process of doing is only instrumentality bringing about a thing of some kind? Do we actually refer to the actual process of *the doing* or *the product* of doing? Austin leaves the possible answers to pragmatic interpretations of specific cases he brings up. He never intends to provide an absolutely correct and definite interpretation.

Interestingly enough the title of Austin's book has no punctuation mark at the end. It could be either a question mark, or a dot or even an ellipsis (a series of three dots) with different implications in each case amounting even to the functional purpose of the utterance. Anyway, to use the title as a guidance one has to be equipped with a faculty of distinguishing words (utterances) and thoughts (logical constructions) as well as broader deeds and things.

All that puts Austinian distinctions and speech-act approach into the context of the overall linguistic and semiotic agenda. There is a need to investigate scientific foundations for advanced methodologies of the studies of human lingual faculties and semiosis. A special section of the article is to elaborate on those issues but before we explore the insights of Martin Heidegger including the one converted into an epigraph of the article.

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2 It is very indicative that Austin titled his preparatory notes for lectures ‚Words and Deeds', not 'Things and Words'.

HEIDEGGER'S HINTS.
Martin Heidegger's language is notoriously difficult. He intended it to embody his singular mode of thinking about human existence and self-reflection. He had to devise ingenious ways of bringing his message home. His verbal swings are nothing but hints to his students and readers. What seems visible straight away is the invention of new words or rather reshaping traditional vocabulary anew.

For that reason, I have to cite Heidegger in the original. Reluctantly but deliberately and consistently I use the forms of Heidegger's nomination (infinitives, gerunds, participles etc.) in their respective format. Thus, I have to replace the traditional translation of the term *das Sein* as *being* with the label *the Be*.

Non-metaphoric metaphors. It is not by chance that those new outlines of the familiar lexical stuff appear metaphorical. Very often there is a strong impression that philosophic substance "is impossible to say outside of metaphor" (Mende 2003, 251). Albeit that Heidegger himself would not agree that his thought or speech are images or metaphors driven. He explains in the "Letter on humanism" published in 1947 and written about a year earlier in correspondence with Jean Beaufret,

"Das Denken baut am Haus des Seins, als welches die Fuge des Seins je geschickhaft das Wesen des Menschen in das Wohnen in der Wahrheit des Seins verfügt. Dieses Wohnen ist das Wesen des »In-der-Welt-seins« (vgl. »S. u. Z.«, S. 54). Der dortige Hinweis auf das »In-Sein« als »Wohnen« ist keine etymologische Spielerei. Der Hinweis in dem Vortrag von 1936 auf Hölderlins Wort »Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch wohnet / der Mensch, auf dieser Erde« ist keine Ausschmückung eines Denkens, das sich aus der Wissenschaft in die Poesie rettet. Die Rede vom Haus des Seins ist keine Übertragung des Bildes vom »Haus« auf das Sein, sondern aus dem sachgemäß gedachten Wesen des Seins werden wir eines Tages eher denken können, was »Haus« und »wohnen« sind."

"The Think (das Denken = nominalized infinitive) builds on (baut am) the house of the Be (das Sein), as that which always happily establishes (je geschickhaft … verfügt) the link between the Be (das Sein = nominalized infinitive or rather etymon or urform) and the essence of man within the Live (das Wohnen = nominalized infinitive) in the truth of the Be (der Wahrheit des Seins). This Live is the essence of "In-the-World-Be" (In-der-Welt-Sein = nominalized word-combination) (cf. "S. u. Z.", p. 54). The hint (der Hinweis) there to "In-Be" (In-Sein = nominalized word-combination) as "Live" is **not an etymological gimmick** (keine etymologische Spielerei). The reference (der Hinweis) in the 1936 lecture[3]

to Hölderlin's words "Quite prepared, but still poetically lives / a human being on this Earth " is not an embellishment of a way of thinking that rescues itself from science into poetry. The talk of the house of the Be **is in no way transfering** (keine Übertragung) of the image of the "house" to the Be. It rather emerges from the properly conceived essence of the Be that one day will make us able to think what "house" and "Live" are". (Heidegger 1976, 358)

In this passage, Heidegger provides a hint of how to tell apart a verbally asserted usual metaphor from his own upfront essential inference and corresponding word-building. He insists that the word *das Haus* he uses "is in no way a transfer (keine Übertragung[4]) of the image (des Bildes) of the 'house' to the Be" but its direct and unmediated re-emergence from the properly conceived essence of the Be (aus dem sachgemäß gedachten Wesen des Seins).

On the whole, Heidegger has to acknowledge that this miraculous emergence is not the fully attained result but rather a hint, a projective momentum for thinking (werden wir eines Tages eher denken können). The initial moment of the Think (*das Denken*) just reconfirms itself in its prospective re-emergence.

A set of question arises. What are after all *house* and *dwelling* called *the Live* (was »Haus« und »wohnen« sind? Are they pure ideas or just ordinary words? Or it is something different? Do Heideggers's intentions actually work? Or they are just hints to the moments of the philosopher's thought? Are they actually Heideggerian notions persistently withstanding the German words actually used?

The answers may vary in diverse contexts and with different readers.

Das Haus*, *die Behausung* and *das Wohnen. It is evident that the difference between the three words used by Heidegger is not just lexical. He needs those words to highlight nuances of his thinking that gradually appear in his perusal.

Probably, one the most well-known and cited dicta by Martin Heidegger is about language as the house of the Be – "Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins" (Heidegger). The maxim was formulated by the philosopher in his "Letter on humanism". It appears on the very beginning of the letter.

In fact, the claim is not limited to the renowned quote but includes at least three consecutive and equally gnomic sentences,

"Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch. Die Denkenden und Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung."

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3 Heidegger presented lecture "Hölderlin and the nature of poetry" in Rome on April 2, 1936 and published it in the December 1936 issue of the journal „Das innere Reich". See also (Heidegger 1981, 33–48).
4 The word *die Übertragung* is a semantic equivalent of the Greek μετἄφορἄ, Latin *transfer, translation, interpretation* etc. and respective terms in linguistic, cognitive and other studies. Thus, Heidegger insists that he semicaly translates his ideas and notions rather than onomasicaly transliterates them. What looks to an unprepared reader like a play on words is intentionally Heidegger's forthright play on ideas and notions.

"Language is the house of the Be. It is in its dwelling (Behausung) that Human (der Mensch) lives in. Those thinking (Denkenden) and creating (Dichtenden) are the guardians of this dwelling". (Heidegger 1976, 313).

It is crucial that the guardians of language are those that think and create it. They are active promoters and creators of language but at the same time find (or make ?) it the place to live in. Language is both what they are continuously doing and the momentary results or residues of their effortful activities.

Furthermore, according to Hölderlin, and also Heidegger to that effect, both die Denkenden and die Dichtenden are also fully prepared (voll Verdienst) and thus embodied in their earthly dwelling or Behausung of both language and the Be. Later Heidegger specifies the notion of creativity that is naturally "prepared" or even "predestined" (Verdienst),

"Voll Verdienst zwar ist der Mensch, wenn er in seinem Wirken Werke schafft. Unübersehbar ist, was der Mensch ausrichtet, wodurch er sich auf der Erde einrichtet, indem er sie bearbeitet, abmüdet und nützt, um sich selbst zu schützen, seine Leistung zu fördern und zu sichern. Doch — ist dies alles schon das Wohnen, das den Menschen heimisch sein läßt in dem Wahren, woran er sich halten kann? Alles Leisten und Werken, Anbauen und Pflegen bleibt »Kultur«. Sie ist immer nur und stets schon die Folge eines Wohnens. Dieses aber ist dichterisch".

"Man is indeed fully prepared when he creates works (ἔργα[5]) in his activities. It is impossible to overlook what man accomplishes by which he establishes himself on Earth, by working it, exhausting it and utilizing it in order to protect himself, promote and secure his performance. But - is all this already the dwelling that makes man feel at home in the care (in dem Wahren – nominalized infinitive in dative) that he can hold on to? All performance and work, cultivation and care remain "culture". It is always only and always already the consequence of dwelling. Anyway, it is also poetic (creative[6])". (Heidegger 1981, 89)

It is worth noting that the majority of the terms used in the quoted extract are nominalized verb-forms – Wirken, Wohnen, Wahren, Leisten, Werken, Anbauen, Pflegen. It is something not occasional and quite consistent with Heidegger's cognitive and communicative practices. On the one hand, he strives to envisage pure and abstract ideas of Platonic brand – something naturally named and nominalized as distinctive mental entities. On the other hand, what he actually grasps are the processes that emerge and evolve – often elusively and deceitfully. Nouns are too rough. Verbs are too intangible. So middle of the way gerunds seem to surface. Participles can also

do. This is the case of both illuminating and concealing the arrival of the Be itself (lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst). This expression is the epigraph of the article. It is a further elaboration of the tree-sentence gnomic account of language in "Letter on humanism". The present participle lichtend directly relates to one of the key notions of Heidegger die Lichtung. Lexically it refers to clearing or glade, but conceptually is quite a tricky notion having more to do with enlightening and elucidating than forestry.

Die Lichtung. Heidegger introduced the term Lichtung in his seminal book "Being and Time" in 1927 – I stick to the title and terminology of the English translation of 1962 and cite it. Both the idea and image of clearing expound the traditional concept of the lumen rationale (natural light) as a metaphor for human understanding,

"Die ontisch bildliche Rede vom lumen naturale im Menschen meint nichts anderes als die existenzial-ontologische Struktur dieses Seienden, daß es ist in der Weise, sein Da zu sein. Es ist »erleuchtet«, besagt: an ihm selbst als In-der-Welt-sein gelichtet, nicht durch ein anderes Seiendes, sondern so, daß es selbst die Lichtung ist. Nur einem existenzial so gelichteten Seienden wird Vorhandenes im Licht zugänglich, im Dunkel verborgen. Das Dasein bringt sein Da von Hause aus mit, seiner entbehrend ist es nicht nur faktisch nicht, sondern überhaupt nicht das Seiende dieses Wesens. Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit". (Heidegger, 133)

"When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there". To say that it is 'illuminated' ["erleuchtet"] means only this - it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself In in-the-World-Be, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, the Here-Be (das Dasein) brings its own "here" along with it. If it lacks its "here", it is not factically the entity which is essentially the Here-Be (das Dasein); indeed, it is not this entity at all. Here-Be is its disclosedness". (Heidegger 1962, 171)

Later on, in his "Letter on humanism" Heidegger further elaborates on die Lichtung des Seins and links it to language,

"Dagegen möchte es scheinen, als sei das Wesen des Göttlichen uns näher als das Befremdende der Lebe-Wesen, näher nämlich in einer Wesensferne, die als Ferne unserem eksistenten Wesen gleichwohl vertrauter ist als die kaum auszudenkende abgründige leibliche Verwandtschaft mit

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5 Heideggerian term Werke (plural of das Werk) happily corresponds to the Greek term ἔργα (plural of ἔργον) as used by Hesiod in his seminal poem "Works and Days" or to the term work by Terrence Deacon (Deacon 2011).
6 The qualification dichterisch happily corresponds both to poetic and creative similar to the key meanings of the Greek ποιέω (I create, make up, and I make verses) and respective adjective ποιητῐκός (both creative and poetic) and noun ποίησις (both creation and poetry).

dem Tier. Solche Überlegungen werfen auf die geläufige und daher immer noch voreilige Kennzeichnung des Menschen als animal rationale ein seltsames Licht. Weil Gewächs und Getier zwar je in ihre Umgebung verspannt, aber niemals in die Lichtung des Seins, und nur sie ist »Welt«, frei gestellt sind, deshalb fehlt ihnen die Sprache. Nicht aber hängen sie darum, weil ihnen die Sprache versagt bleibt, weltlos in ihrer Umgebung. Doch in diesem Wort „Umgebung" drängt sich alles Rätselhafte des Lebe-Wesens zusammen. Die Sprache ist in ihrem Wesen nicht Äußerung eines Organismus, auch nicht Ausdruck eines Lebewesens. Sie läßt sich daher auch nie vom Zeichencharakter her, vielleicht nicht einmal aus dem Bedeutungscharakter wesensgerecht denken. Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst"

"On the other hand, it would seem as if the essence of the divine is closer to us than the alienating nature of living beings, closer namely in a remoteness of essence that is nevertheless more familiar to our ecsistent being than the almost unimaginable abysmal bodily kinship with the animal. Such considerations shed a strange light on the common and therefore still premature labeling of man as an *animal rationale*. Since plants and animals are indeed tensely braced in their surroundings (Überlegungen) but not at all free in the clearing of being - only this being their "world" - they lack language. But it is not because language is denied them that they hang in their worldless surroundings. But in this word " surroundings" all the mystery of the living being is compressed. In its essence, language is not the expression of an organism, nor is it the expression of a living being. It can therefore never be thought of in terms of its character as a sign, perhaps not even in terms of its meaning. Language is the illuminating and concealing arrival of being itself". (326)

The actual meaning of Heidegger's message is that the phenomenon the tries to grasp and think over is neither a thing, nor an organism or not even a kind of nominalized thing-like entity. It is resonant with what another courageous thinker and linguist formulated a while later, "Our predecessors thought of language as an organism, and drew their analogies from evolution. We reject this as misleading; but no less misleading is its familiar substitute, according to which language is an edifice and the morphemes are the bricks. Perhaps if language had been thought of as activity we should never have heard of "morphemics." (Halliday 2002[1961], 64−65). Probably, the most relevant term Halliday could use was *languaging*. Equally, the German *Versprachlichung* could best fit Heideger's verbiage and thinking.

DIE SPRACHE, DAS SPRECHEN UND DIE VERSPRACHLICHUNG
Heidegger was a traditionally educated philosopher very much metaphysically minded and styled. He stuck to abstract metaphysical terms and could not do it otherwise. So, he doggedly uses nouns to grasp the phenomenal aspects of his subject matter. Thus, Heidegger introduces

a further clarification referring to the truth of existence rather than being as such,

"Die Sprache verweigert uns noch ihr Wesen: daß sie das Haus der Wahrheit des Seins ist. Die Sprache überläßt sich vielmehr unserem bloßen Wollen und Betreiben als ein Instrument der Herrschaft über das Seiende". (318)

"Language still denies us (verweigert uns) its essence: that it is the house of *the truth* of the Be (das Haus der Wahrheit des Seins). Rather, language abandons itself (überläßt sich) to our mere willing and operating as an instrument of dominating (ein Instrument der Herrschaft) over the being (das Seiende)". (318)

Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes the elusiveness of language itself (c.f. its denials and abandons) that doubles being into Be as such (das Sein) and actual enduring, being (das Seiende). The quasi-nominal forms that he metaphysically applies, in fact, are nothing but verbal formations like infinitives, gerunds and participles,

"Das Denken bringt nämlich in seinem Sagen nur das ungesprochene Wort des Seins zur Sprache.

Die hier gebrauchte Wendung »zur Sprache bringen« ist jetzt ganz wörtlich zu nehmen. Das Sein kommt, sich lichtend, zur Sprache. Es ist stets unterwegs zu ihr. Dieses Ankommende bringt das ek-sistierende Denken seinerseits in seinem Sagen zur Sprache- Diese wird so selbst in die Lichtung des Seins gehoben. Erst so ist die Sprache in jener geheimnisvollen und uns doch stets durchwaltenden Weise, Indem die also voll ins Wesen gebrachte Sprache geschichtlich ist, ist das Sein in das Andenkenverwahrt. Die Ek-sistenz bewohnt denkend das Haus des Seins. In all dem ist es so, als sei durch das denkende Sagen gar nichts geschehen."

"In its Say (Sagen), the Think (das Denken) brings thus the as yet unspoken word of the Be into language (nur das ungesprochene Wort des Seins zur Sprache).

"The expression (Wendung) used here "to bring up into speech" is now to be taken quite literally. Be, clearing itself (sich lichtend), comes to speech (zur Sprache). It is always on its way to it. For its part, this arriving brings the ek-sisting Think to language in its Say - this itself is thus lifted into the clearing of the Be (die Lichtung des Seins). That is how language emerge in its mysterious and yet always decisive for us way. Since language thus fully returned to its essence is historical, The Be is in the memory (das Andenkenverwahrt). Thinking (denkend) ek-sistence inhabits the house of Be. In all this, it is as if nothing at all has come out with the thought over Say (das denkende Sagen)." (361−362)

That far for very insightful hints of Martin Heidegger albeit formulated in atrociously nominalized periphrasis of metaphysics. More lucid jargon of linguists – particularly those of functionalist or socio-semiotic vocations

is to follow. Hopefully, they better suit the consideration of languaging practices.

THINGS APART AND PROCESSES VERSUS NOUNS AND VERBS

Expression *things apart* was used by the outstanding social scientist Charles Tilly in his book "Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons" (Tilly 1984). He used this expression to refer to deceitful objects of studies that the majority of his colleagues single out and believe in their actual existence. He used the word-combination to formulate the eight Pernicious Postulates that social sciences of his age – and ours, alas, too – inherited "from a mistaken reading of nineteenth-century social changes". The first of those postulates reads, "'Society' is a thing apart; the world as a whole divides into distinct 'societies,' each having its more or less autonomous culture, government, economy, and solidarity" (Tilly 1984, 11).

The very specific mental habits of the founders of political science were shaped by historians, philosophers or lawyers who drew on the traditions of medieval scholasticism, whether realist or nominalist. Philosophical traditions required working with generalized concepts in the mode of abstract timeless speculations. Legal skills presupposed appealing to generalized normative prescriptions imposed upon specific cases. Variability, transformations, metamorphoses, etc. were either ignored, or treated as an annoying nuisance. That left only essential "things" as habitual objects of study.

A courageous attempt to demonstrate why societies are not things apart was undertaken by a famous French orientalist Ernest Renan. In his lecture on March 11, 1882, he defined a nation as an everyday plebiscite (un plébiscite de tous les jours). Renan justified his interpretation by abandoning "metaphysical and theological abstractions" (les abstractions métaphysiques et théologiques), then biology and racial doctrines. He also discarded normative language and religion studies of his age. Renan also suggested to disregard even pragmatic interests (both economics, without naming it, and geography. Renan focused on what he called "a soul," or rather some general "spiritual principle" (une âme, un principe spirituel). However, for him this was not a speculative and abstract, but a very concrete principle, realized in the daily practices of each person: "So, the nation is a great solidarity (une grande solidarité), established by a sense of sacrifices that have already been made and that are located to make in the future. The nation presupposes the past, but in the present moment, it is summarized by a quite tangible fact: it is a clearly expressed desire to continue the common life (le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune). The existence of the nation is (if I may say so) an everyday plebiscite, just as the existence of the individual is an eternal affirmation of life (une affirmation perpétuelle de vie)" (Renan 1882, 27).

In Renan's interpretation, the nation was not a discrete entity (thing apart, chose à part). It was a relentlessly reproducing phenomenon, or an endless process of unfolding in the space-time of the common enterprise of generations.

In fact, not only social scientists are inclined to split the world around into crisp fragments of things or other disjuncts of some kind – be they material object or bits of time. We all do it naturally and spontaneously. For us languages and cultures are also things apart. But what we think to be crisp sets are in actual fact fuzzy sets. Any language is a fuzzy set. Just consider English not only from a comfortable Oxbridge station of RP but also from East End, Derry, Mumbai or Bronx. Or remember also the English of Ishiguro, Joyce, Nabokov, Whitman, Swift, Shakespeare and Chaucer. Or your own English, my dear reader, to that effect.

As long as you move away from your immediate everyday vicinity what you take to be crisp things tend to turn fuzzy. We cannot be sure why and how it happens. To my mind, we, the humans happened to be at the privileged time-space juncture attuned to perception and scrutiny of the so-called Observable Universe. And that makes the difference. We are inclined to lazily believe that all of the Universe is just like it is in our immediate vicinity.

If you look out of your immediate everyday time-space vicinity your outlook would change. With your downslide into a microcosm of atoms and fundamental particles the time-space dimensions change – time 'accelerates' and space 'curves'. Similarly, with your ascend into galactic macrocosm time 'accelerates' and space 'curves' again but in a kind of an inverted mode.

As soon as your study of language and thought escapes here and now, *hic et nunc* of obvious evidentiality it establishes their continuous transformations into each other. As long as they are distributed, embedded, enacted or otherwise extended, their dimensions and specific parameters change. You would shape you mental and communicative practices to be able to consider and explain to yourself and others the growing alternatives of past and future, of processes completed or still continuing, practices that are possible or not. Intriguingly all those subtle distinctions of modes and modalities are mainly related to emerging, continuing or completed processes that somehow influence your very thinking, speaking and very being – very much in perplexing ways outlined in Heidegger's hints.

It is equally fascinating that we lean to classify into crisp objects or things apart only the immediate phenomena of your surroundings or as they are perceived from those quarters. Linguistically φαινόμενον is a neuter middle/passive participle of Greek φαίνω ("I appear, shine"). It is an inclusive appearing in some ways quite similar to Heideggerian *Lichtung*.

Something appears and becomes highlighted by the focus of our interest, comprehension and explanation with the help of speech. It is extremely challenging and at the same time awkward to grasp it and express verbally. The great minds like Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Austin and Halliday advanced with the job but confronted tremendous lingual and communicative complications

and intricacies. The problem rests with constraints and curbs "instinctively" inherent to the ways and habits of our mental or verbal behaviors.

Evolving self-contained phenomena and similar confusing by all means must be indeterminate to us, so we can grasp their make-up and meaning as if they were kind of things apart prone for reductions and simplifications. So, it is only to be expected that we all have no choice but engage in splitting the world around into objects of some kind and interpreting their ongoing changes as actions and activities of the objects. Thus we objectivize, reify and nominate instances around and ascribe to them willing, acting and – linguistically speaking – predication.

NOMINALIZATION AND PREDICATION

Language is prone to nominalization, which is a very powerful tool for transforming and even deforming thinking and consciousness. We are fascinated by words and the mental generalizations expressed by them in memory, while the reality of the processes of existence of the Observable Universe, of life on planet Earth, of its human expansion into anthropogenic life actually eludes us and is only partially, episodically and incompletely grasped by us at the cost of considerable effort.

Nominalization induces a mental reduction of processes to their fixed signs, moments and results, i.e. their sensorially caught and deposited traces (residues) rather than the phenomena themselves. Further, these traces are fetishized and turned into something seemingly real - first of all, things (thing, res), and after them with subjects and objects.

We have inherited from the scholastics the general attitude of naming, understanding, and seeing all their own mental creations as either things or names. And this habit is so strong and powerful that it still shapes our consciousness and thinking in spite of all the innovations of positive, empirical and even critical research.

A typical example in this regard is given by Descartes. To critically test the abilities of cognition, he makes a thought experiment. Descartes consistently rejects everything that he can consider to be alien or auxiliary to his own personality, e.g. particularly so in "The Discourse on the Method" and "Meditations on the First Philosophy". The result is a step-by-step reduction of the multi-component integral self (*me totum*) (Brown 2007; Brown 2014; Brown 2016; Ilyin 2020) up to two finite limits – the essence of one's own disembodied mind and the body, purified of the slightest thinking abilities. At the same time, *me totum* does not disappear anywhere.

When ready with the bulk of the text of his "Meditations" René Descartes invited a few of his close peers in mediating intricate problems of human understanding to comment on key points of his writing. Thomas Hobbes was among them. In his "third" objections Hobbes, demonstrates that the interpretation of the results of Decartes' experiment in scholastic terms of substance turns into a significant distortion: "Which of all this can be separated from my consciousness? What can be

considered separate from myself? Perhaps someone will answer this: I myself, the thinker, differ from my thinking; My thinking is not alienated from me, but only perfectly, in the same sense that jumping is different from jumping. So, if Mr. Descartes began to prove that he, the comprehending, is identical with comprehension, we would again fall into the *scholastic style* (emphasis added. – M. I.). The intellect comprehends, the sight sees, the will desires, and thus, according to the law of analogy, the step, or at least the ability to walk, will walk. All this is vague, incongruous and unworthy of the everlasting clarity of expression inherent in Mr. Descartes." (Cartesius 1641, 243)

Descartes is forced to agree with Hobbes's arguments, but not to abandon the language and style of scholasticism: "I do not deny that I, the thinker, am different from my thinking, as a thing is from a modus; But when I ask: what of all this can be separated from my consciousness? (quid ergo est quod à mea cogitatione distinguatur) – I understand the modes of thinking I have listed, not my substance; And where I add: What can be called alienated from myself? (quid quod à mepso separatum dici possit) – I only mean by this that all these modes are intrinsic to me (significo tantum illos omnes cogitandi modus mihi enesse). I don't see what can be depicted here as dubious and dark." (Cartesius 1641, 243)

Descartes was quite sincere in preserving phenomenal perception of himself – and any person to that effect – as *me totum*, but he unintentionally slipped into a scholastic fallacy. He kept ascribing to himself and any individual human different modes of existence or practical behaviors and practices, but simultaneously he habitually introduced substances corresponding to the modes of behavior or types of practices. None of those could be alienated from him as a total entity. But despite it Descartes nominated two complementary aspects of his entity *a soul* and *a body* and ascribed them equally contrastive modes and predications of *thinking* and *extending*.

This hint was readily acquired by his obedient followers who straightforwardly expounded it into the so-called cartesian fallacy. Eventually it developed into mind-body problem, hard problem of consciousness and other which are considered 'unresolvable' but in fact are nothing but lingo-cognitive self-deceptions.

MODES OF PRACTICES AND LINGUISTIC MODALITIES

It seems that our cognitive, communitive and lingual practices are doomed to all kind of fallacies and limitation. But being free and genuine masters of ourselves we can make a choice how to deal with them. We can doggedly resort exclusively to nominalization and splitting the world and ourselves into disjunct pieces and things apart of all kinds. Or we may accept it as the last resort and replace the nous with alternative word-forms like Heidegger did. Or we may be even more inventive, pragmatic and effective.

We can also compensate fallacies by more elaborate predication. There are also fallacies inherent to it, but are better attuned to grasping processes and interpreting them. Particularly effective may be modalities and pragmatic markers. But exceptionally advantageous could be very special and even looking weird verb-forms, predicatives and other rhematic formats.

Verbal affordances allow us to perceive and master alternative modes of human and cosmic existence. They do it naturally and easily. To translate them into a traditional philosophic parlance is not an easy job as Heidegger's case confirms. It is possible to apply verb-forms and their derivatives to refer to evolving complex processes and practices that in ordinary speech and scientific discourses usually designated by nouns like life, time, language, nation, history etc. Heidegger made a courageous effort to systematically rename of entities and developments that were not things apart. But this was an exceptional and very personal endeavor. This could hardy work with schools and universities, commercial enterprises and mass media.

Much better example is the term *phenomenon* and its possible alternatives. To a speaker of English and most of the modern European languages the word may sound as an ordinary noun. But in fact it is not – at least to a person aware that it is a very old Greek verb-form. Grammatically φαινόμενον is neuter present middle/passive participle of the verb φαίνω, having distinctly different meanings in three different voices: "I reveal something" (active transitive), "I shine" (active intransitive) and "I appear" (middle/passive). It is tempting to 'translate' the particle into German of Kantian or Heideggerian brands. It may sound impressive and enlightening but English *appearance* and Russian *явление* (iavleniye) would do. They are noun-forms but their verbal semantics has not completely disappeared. With all that, novel translations *self-appearing* and *самоявляемое* might be more accurate and thorough.

Another suggestion has to do with an expression *thing apart*. On the one hand it sound more definite and even radical then just a noun *thing*. On the other its second component has a clear semantic implication. It is a grammatical qualification of a very old type – that of "an achieved or attained quality of an action" like in the similar 'adverbs' *alive*, *akin, alone* etc. The suggestion is to drop the perplexing and unnecessary component *thing* and to keep only *apart* alone. Then we could easily and much more adequately call the entities we single out *apart* be they stable material objects of fluid processes and practices.

Phenomenal aspects of life, human and cosmic existence appear and become actualized by our own cognitive and communicative efforts, particularly with the use verbal forms of all kind and predication it its broadest sense.

It may be quite crude, but linguistically successful to say that numerous and diverse virtual phenomena essentially belong to what has recently been called a distributed language (distributed language) (Cowley 2009; Cowley 2019). They are aptly highlighted by the terms languaging and linguistics, actively promoted by radically embodied ecolinguistics (Steffensen, Cowley 2021; Cowley, Gahrn-Andersen 2022; Thibault 2020; Thibault 2021. This direction is proactively and very creatively looking for new opportunities to understand the ways of human communication and thinking, trying to better understand what is happening in the language sphere.

PRAGMATIC CONCLUSION

With all the importance of semantic improvements of terminology and vocabulary as well as experiments with parts of speech using syntactic devices it is pragmatics of scholarly research and responsible social behavior that basically enacts new affordances of cognition and communication. Those affordances make the enlanguaging effective medium of interaction between the domains of human activities from environmental and physical to communicative and mental. With their crucial pragmatic potential enlanguaging practices become interactive controls or interfaces of overall human advancement. The entire human phenomenon, *le phénomène humain*, and particularly enlanguaging and embodying our aspirations, visions and even fantasies is the result of interactive 'fine frenzy rolling, magnificently presented by Shakespeare's Theseus:

The poet's eye, in fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

Those unceasing efforts require new modes of languaging and thinking.

To that effect, certain advances have been proposed within the approach of the so-called four E's - embodying, embedding, enacting, extending. Of course, the number of such transformative practices can be multiplied. Paul Thibault, for example, singles out nine E's only for embodying languaging, "The present study aligns with and builds on recent developments in "4E" theories of cognition according to which cognition is embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive. I propose that languaging can be productively thought about in terms of what I will call the 9 Es of languaging. 9E languaging is embodied, enkinaesthetic, empathic, enactive, enskilled, embedded, extended, experiential, and ecological". (Thibault 2020, 12).

Phenomena of our In-the-World-being are embodied (actually relentlessly embodying, enacting etc.) and thus shaped or rather shaping themselves by limitations, restrictions and other externalities. Auspiciously we can deal with those externalities and transform them into favorable options or even affordances. To do it we recreate or 'copy' externalities internally. Becoming internalities those 'copies' re-emerge already as internal affordances. By interacting with each other and our common

environment we may in some relevant ways reactivate externalities and turn them into external affordances in some relevant ways.

This ongoing flow of reshaping our Dasein and the world at large is functionally heading further on and on to a crucial extent due to specific enlanguaging and en-languaged practices or incessant languaging.

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