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Bringing Things into Languaging or Not: The Role of Internal Dialogue

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Abstract: This essay deals with how to "bring things into languaging" (`enlanguaging´). The theoretical background is a humanistic perspective, Merleau-Ponty´s phenomenology and extended dialogism. It will be argued that the phenomenon of `internal dialogue´, i.e., internal interaction within individual minds, are at play in such processes. This paper will consider different activities such as perception, thinking, speaking, planning for speaking, understanding, reading, interaction, and decision-making. It also pays attention to circumstances when public talk is evaded or inhibited.

Keywords: Phenomenology, enlanguaging, internal dialogue, thinking, speaking, reading, decision-making.

1. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIALOGUE

The purpose of this essay is to argue for the importance of internal dialogue in languaging, in particular its role in *"bringing something into languaging* or into language systems".[1] will also try to answer questions like: What *is* internal dialogue? *When, where* and *why* do internal dialogues occur?[2]

Languaging in talk and text (the latter including both production and interpretation) are external and observable language uses.[3] Yet, language plays much richer role than this in the lives of people. Internal dialogue is ineluctable in the human mind. This becomes particularly salient, if we are interested in how things are "brought into languaging". Yet, many linguists and interactionists simply ignore it. For example, Conversation Analysis (CA) does not bother, basically for methodological reasons (internal or individual activities are seldom subjected to reliable documentation). However,

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1 use the term "bringing something into language (or languaging)" as synonym for `enlanguaging´ (as that term is used in this journal issue). My term was probably coined by Gadamer (1975), and later taken up by Ragnar Rommetveit (2008; Joseph 1998).

2 The terms dialogue, dialogicality, dialogism, and monologism. might need some explanation. A *dialogue* is process based on interaction involving two or more persons´ or systems´ active sense-makings. This means that dialogue and dialogism always presuppose the role of the *other* also (indirectly) in *individuals´* sense-making. dialogue can be *external*, i.e. available in public, e.g. in talk, gestures, or documented in written or printed texts, or it can be *internal* within person or system, involving different "voices" or perspectives on the current topic. *Dialogicality* refers to the existence of *sense-making mind*, equipped with agency and capacity of understanding, primarily in human beings. Dialogism is scholarly or philosophical approach that ascribes dialogicality to the human mind. Monologism is mono-perspectival approach to data or theory. Details on dialogism can be found in, e.g., Bakhtin (1981, 1990), Marková (2016), or Linell (2009, 2022a,b).

3 The terms language system and linguistic practices (or languaging) are legion in the discipline of linguistics. "Linguistic practices", or "language use", are practices in which at least fragments of languaging are involved.
In this paper build upon phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 1973) and dialogism (n. 1). For discussion of languaging as first-order dynamics in social practices and second-order abstracted language systems, see Becker (1991), Love (2004), Thibault (2011), and Steffensen (2009, 2013).

the position of ignoring internal dialogue for this reason is in the long run not fruitful. [4]

What *is* internal dialogue then? As we will see in this article, there are many forms and facets of internal dialogue. basic manifestation is when an individual conducts tacit argumentation with him/herself (`auto-dialogue´; Linell 2009, 121f.). But there is also `hetero-dialogue´ (ibid., 120); what the individual says when speaking aloud (section 4 below), or in his tacit auto-dialogue, includes the verbalisation of ideas that have been taken over, perhaps in more or less distorted form, from others (who may be present or absent in the current episode). In this way, versions of others´ perspectives are included in the individual´discourse[5] (see sections 3, 4, and elsewhere below). Thus, the individual engages in deliberations with(in) him/herself: in tacit discourse too internal utterance-like (non-public) contributions follow each other, so that one contribution will be followed by an agreeing or disagreeing second contribution, and this may be followed by third contribution, and so on, as in common argumentation. Importantly, however, will *not* assume that internal contributions are exclusively verbal; they can be only partially enlanguaged, or less conscious contribution (such as mental image), or it will be opposed to both of these, as linguistic formulation spoken aloud (see below).

2. PERCEPTION

I will begin with how aspects of *perception of the environment* are brought into language. In fully accomplished apperception the awareness of things "comes to us" automatedly, that is, the processes work without conscious attention and usually without being brought into explicit and conscious languaging. We apperceive the things out there without "representing" in language what we see, hear, smell, etc. (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Linell, Boström 2024). Similarly, great deal of `internal dialogue´ - what is conventionally called "thinking" or "thought" [6] - remains silent and internal. It is normally not spoken aloud, and is therefore not "on record" and cannot be systematically inspected, i.e., not subjected to studies in systematic CA.

Smooth perception results in apperceiving "things" "directly" (cf. above) which are sometimes brought into focal awareness, or occasionally *not* brought into either awareness or language. We are faced with an automated perceptual reaction by the mind. In routinised perceptual process, known and recalled content is brought easily into language, that is, it receives its conventional linguistic "labels"; words function as "names", to use mundane expression.

2.1 PROBLEMATIC PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES

However, things are oftentimes different. Instead of an unproblematic apperception, we may be stuck with *problem-ridden perception* of the environment. Such incidents occur when solitary individual happens to end up in situation, in which problem-solving internal thinking is, at least temporarily, insufficient. The perceiver must often try with loudly spoken self-talk. But first slightly different case from the literature:

(1)THE SHIP (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 17; accounts for an apperception in progress)

If walk along shore towards ship which has run aground, and the funnel or masts merge into the forest bordering on the sand dune, there will be moment when these details suddenly become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused with it. As approached, did not perceive resemblances or proximities which finally came together to form continuous picture of the upper part of the ship. merely felt that the look of the object was on the point of altering, that something was imminent in this tension, as storm is imminent in storm clouds. Suddenly the sight before me was recast in manner satisfying to my vague expectation. Only afterwards did recognize, as justifications for the change, the resemblance and contiguity of what call `stimuli´ - namely the most determinate phenomena, seen at close quarters and with which compose the `true´ world. `How could have failed to see that these pieces of wood were an integral part of the ship? For they were of the same colour as the ship, and fitted well enough into its superstructure´.

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4 Graumann (1988) questions number of (what are in his and many others´) "misidentifications" of phenomenology. These "misidentifications" have claimed that phenomenology has obligatory links to introspection, individualism, subjectivity, methodological unacceptability, concern with "appearances", rather than with any underlying and often hidden "reality", etc.

5 The term "discourse" is multi-ambiguous and slippery. The best interpretation, which is still unclear, is that `discourse´ is everything participants in communicative situation say and do. However, we are accustomed to use it preferably about cases of (coherent) language practices that are then more important than other doings (communicative contributions in and through other semiotic resources: e.g., gestures, facial expressions, bodily movements and postures), but also than not doing anything public at all (silence and its co-occurrences). The following would then not belong to `discourse´: internal processes, situations, non-communicative and unpredictable events, including verbal responses that don´t fit in the preceding discourse. The last item belongs to grey zone bordering on discourse. But talk about another type, which some will consider to be dubious, namely, `internal dialogue´, cases in which the person conducts an internal (and individual) dialogue, usually tacitly but exceptionally as loud self-talk. (use the term in this sense in the context where the present note belongs.) The motivation for this use is that `internal dialogue´ often takes the form of an internalised exchange with clear similarities to social (external) dialogue. Dialogism is not only about social forms of communication and cognition; it is also about self-directed tacit deliberations, and in ontogenesis about the development of individuality (see work cited n. 2 above).
Summing up, the term "discourse" is very much abused term. This easily makes it empty and useless. Recall, for example, the view sometimes launched that evaything in the world is discourse.

6 do of course not assume that all kinds of thinking, or cognition, are wrapped up in words.

Merleau-Ponty here recounts some moments of dynamic process of perceiving scene that he did not understand from the outset. It is what would call an episode from his internal dialogue involving sequence of impressions he had during these moments. Some might call it period of thinking, but there are no traces of any of them as items brought into language. It is possible, though, that some of the segments were indeed vaguely enlanguaged. But it is only in the last two sentences, as kind of afterthought that he brings question and motivation for the question into language ("How could I…").

The process (as it is quoted by the perceiver himself) starts with some "details" which reminds him of the upper part of vessel, but these details are "indissolubly fused" with parts of forest, which makes the whole scene problematic, indeed incomprehensible. One reason why he could not see what was there to be seen, was presumably that the pieces of wood, parts of the vessel and the forest, had the same colour. It is only towards the end that he realises that the "thing" was indeed ship, which fitted the whole scene ("superstructure"). One might think that the process from its beginning to its end was not so exotic. After having approached the fragment to be determined, his image of it was still "vague expectation". But the final and "correct" solution appeared "suddenly", as is typically the case in "problematic processes" of perception. In the next excerpt we will see some of the same circumstances at play:

(2) THE WALNUT INCIDENT (Linell 2022a; self-experienced episode; translation from Swedish)
The problem emerges during walk of mine in well-known surrounding, park which am fairly familiar with. But on this occasion happened to catch sight of an unknown, big, beautifully grown tree at distance, perhaps some hundred metres away. may have paid some attention to it before, but this time was unable to identify its botanical species directly. The indeterminacy gave rise to linguistic and partly pre-conceptual internal dialogue: was this specimen of beech or an oak, or perhaps lime-tree, or even something more exotic, such as Catalpa tree. (When afterwards recalled this moment was not sure that actualised any clear linguistic designations, except in the case of Catalpa.) The internal dialogue was not only characterised by the conceptual confusion, but also by an interest to solve the problem, as well as by emotions, in particular the annoyance at not being capable of understanding what was seeing. walked closer to the tree, and when was really close, realised that it was walnut tree; whispered to myself: "it´obviously walnut tree!" It was only in the final stages of the whole perceptual process that the culturally correct name (walnut) crossed my mind. When this occasioned insight finally surfaced, its verbal designation was clearly subdued in something like whisper. The interpretive process went from what the tree seemed to be ("appearance") to what it actually was

("sense" in narrower meaning). In this process with its various aspects and suggestions couldn´t entirely avoid linguistic labels.

Before leaving for moment "the walnut incident"[7], couple of additional points should be raised. The event contains mixture of ideas, thoughts ("cognitions", some "enlanguaged"), feelings, actions, some of which remained private and others were potentially made public (though there was no audience present). The verbal ingredients are interspersed by desires, doubts, insights, etc. which are not always brought into language.

It is important to point out the close link between the perceptual process and *practical action* (section 3). Of particular importance are my physical movements, the steps aside and changes of body posture as *approached* the target object. It is characteristic of modern theories of perception that they emphasise the dependence of visual (or other) perception on other senses, in particular hearing and touch, and physical movements which literally give rise to different view-points which may facilitate new insights. Language comes in here and there. It is typical, though, that "bringing into languaging" emerges more or less as final spontaneous response ("it´obviously walnut tree"), when the problem has just been dissolved.

3. PRACTICAL ACTION
The relative scarcity of talk in the walnut incident has its counterparts in many complex apperceptions, but also in other activities, as participants engage in practical actions. In everyday life, people execute many tasks, many of which contain subtasks. Often they become routines. Peter Jones (2018) describes an automated case with little languaging: nurse´morning routines before leaving home to go to her job. Jones does not look upon this case in terms of dialogue; in fact, one may imagine that there is limited use of verbal support in single moments (though Jones does not discuss these differences). Since this (fictive?) case involves action according to an automated "script" (Schank, Abelson 1977), there is not necessarily any internal dialogue either. But suppose that some details can go wrong at some points in the nurse´application of her routinised "script". For example, she may fail to find particular garment, such as her bra. Stuck in such predicament, she would probably wait for some seconds or even minutes, explore the whereabouts, also invoking bit of internal dialogue ("where could it be?"), perhaps even spoken aloud to oneself.

4. SPEAKING
Conversations do not consist only of the participants´ loudly spoken utterances. In addition, *participants respond to others´ (and self´s) utterances* before, during and after these utterances occur, as long as they can hear and attend to what the others say, and they don´t think that they must inhibit some topics. Self´internal or

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7 have small corpus of perceptual episodes documented (Linell 2022a, 100−104; Linell, Boström 2024). cite only "The walnut incident" here.

externalised (often multi-voiced) interpretations of input from others and own knowledge and positions often occur quite frequently. But many inhibitions are concealed by the person involved (hence, they end up as parts only in the internal "discourse"). Thus, the individual often remains in his/her own auto-dialogue. Yet, auto-dialogue often leaks out into the external dialogue in the social interaction, usually via various "non-verbal" expressions. Another kind of self´dialogue is multi-voiced external talk containing responses of agreement with present or absent others (`hetero-dialogue´; Linell 2009, 124ff), in addition to own content. All these actions may be partly or wholly internal, half-choked rather than spoken aloud.

The impact on self´thoughts and utterances (in auto- and hetero-dialogues) are, as pointed out, closely related to hearing and understanding (section 5 below), but sometimes it also affects self´own public utterances. However, the responses to such utterances remain typically publicly inhibited.

Often, agreements or disagreements may of course be pronounced; recall response particles such as *mm*, *yes*, *no*, etc. But disagreements are often first invoked emotionally, for example, in diffuse reactions of uneasiness, dissent or lack of self-confidence (perhaps due to personality traits). Conversation Analysts (CA) point out that disagreements tend to be "dispreferred" (Levinson 1983, 307). Stances may of course be aired in the form of self-directed proposals or rejections of proposals. Parts of these reactions are often outside of proper languaging. Unfortunately, it is difficult to register both internal and external discourse simultaneously. But we can recall our own experiences of listening to lectures and participating in conversation, be it through agreements or disagreements, that is, these situations may invoke internal responses, such as "don´t agree", or "why do not say so (or haven´t said so)"?

The absence of reliable documentation of both internal and external initiatives and responses in situations of talk-in-interaction may be compensated for by many accounts in the literature. In section 7, will refer to Fjodor Dostojevskij´novels, and many other literary products.

5. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR SPEAKING

It is very common that an incoming speaker will somehow prepare or plan his or her upcoming utterance in some ways and at some level of detail. The planning of one´prospective discourse is often responsive to prior discourse (self´or others´) and is interdependent between the speaker´recall and future anticipations, all of which involves internal dialogue and relating the present both to the past (as recalled) and the future (as planned). However, will not dwell further on this common activity here. problem is that the planning is seldom documented. What

we can observe is often preparations such as inbreaths and beginnings in the form of some short and interrupted snippet of the immanent utterance. For example, in line 19 of the excerpt (5) below, the police inspector starts by self-standing *now* followed by micro-pause, and then comes parenthetic insert before *now* is repeated, this time fulfilling its function in full (complex) sentence.

leave the current topic of the prior paragraph, in order to review some data from experiments with speakers of different languages. Strömqvist (2009; Strömqvist, Verhoeven 2004) organised experimental situations in which subjects of different ages and with different first languages were asked to study wordless comic strips, that showed different animals who were about to do something. For example, one sequence of strips showed an owl which had suddenly appeared in hole of tree. The task of the subjects was to predict in their own words what was about to happen. Obviously, normal subject´reaction might expect the owl to fly out. These language users are known to express movements of living creatures to prefer descriptions of the *kind of movement* or the *direction of the movement*. The experimenters engaged subjects whose first language was Romance language (French, Spanish) or Germanic language (German, Swedish). Interestingly, German speakers described what happened as *eine Eule plötzlich raus flattert* ("an owl flutters suddenly out"), and the Swedes formulated themselves similarly. However, those with Romance first languages did not describe the movement as such ("*flutter*" rather than, say, *"climb out"*); instead, they simply focused on the direction of the movement, in French something like *d´un trou de l´arbre sort un hibou* ("out of the hole in the tree an owl comes out (leaves)"), or in Spanish *sale un buho* ("an owl leaves"). Thus, speakers of different languages may select different properties as most important (what is immediately attended to). Even more interestingly, however, subjects tended to focus their visual explorations on different details in the drawings; through studies of the subjects´ eye movements before they issued their linguistic utterances, the researchers found that Germanic subjects concentrated more on movements (fluttering), Romans subjects on directions of the flight ("out of the hole"). Strömqvist interprets this as evidence for mild version of the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis (Gumperz, Levinson 1996). That is, ordinary speakers seem to adopt slightly different strategies in searching through the environment before "bringing their impressions into language". Strömqvist, following Slobin (1996), calls this "thinking for speaking".[8]

6. INTERACTION

"The walnut incident" in section 2.1 involved solitary person who was in trouble in the process of his apperception and identification of the correct categorisation of certain

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8 We may note that Strömqvist´experimental study focuses on "bringing things into language systems", whereas most of my other examples are based on single-case studies of languaging. However, Strömqvist´focus on language systems (Germanic, Romance) could be reinterpreted as based on patterns in languaging.

tree. Next we will look at problematic case in which two persons are involved in common interaction.

(3) SIMSON AND DELILAH (Translated from Swedish, for details, see Linell (2022a, 245f)): Two persons; Ida and Joe, have dinner outdoors in summer restaurant. Suddenly, Joe introduces brand new topic in lines 1-4:)

1. JOE: what was the name of the biblical person who was very
2.   strong an´ his strength was in his long hair? it
3.   passed through the girl´mind that she could cut it
4.   off when he was asleep
5. …………… (3.0)
6. JOE: there is an opera about it. we have seen it--
7. IDA: well, yeah—
8. JOE: Simon?
9. IDA: know the melody (humming melody from an opera)
10. JOE: Delilah!
11. IDA: Simson and Delilah
12. JOE: *Samson-et-Delilah* in French. by Sains-Saëns.
13.   he wrote only one opera.
14. IDA: that was genuinely dialogical process.

The two persons engaged in this word-search used one participant´(Joe) initiation of the topic the preparatory fragments in his auto-dialogue (see section 4). In lines 1-4, Joe was the only agent or speaker. After this, the two co-operated after Joe had offered more material in line 6. Then the two exchanged short contributions which solved the problem in lines 7-12. Note that lines 1-12 all function to solve Joe´problem, as initiated in lines 1-6, which in an internal dialogue would have been his own (silent or spoken) auto-dialogue. The pause (line 5) occurs in stretch of thoughts brought into language only by Joe. After this pause, Joe provides another piece of information (line 6), which reflects the interest in operas shared by the two interactants, and which is probably of great help for Ida. At first, she cannot produce the name (line 7), but Joe provides close-to-adequate alternative, quite typical for "tip-of-the-tongue" (Brown, McNeill 1966) word-search. In line 10, Joe produces another useful piece of information. Ida is, however, the one who first comes up with the correct name (line 11). The episode is then closed by the two: Joe (lines 12-13) recalls the context of the opera, whereas Ida (line 14) makes suitable comment on their joint result.

7. LISTENING, READING AND UNDERSTANDING
The prior text implies, however, that there is covert internal dialogue in the process of *understanding the other*. This is monological in the sense that it is driven by only one subject, although it takes the form of an internal auto-dialogue. Consequently, one and the same sequence could sometimes be both monologue and kind of dialogue.

Internal dialogue is therefore also engaged in both *speakers´ and attentive listeners´ activities in ordinary conversations*. But internal dialogue (that which was earlier often termed "internal speech", or simply; thinking; e.g., Vygotsky 1987) is engaged in many other mental activities: planning of discourse, perception and description of the environment, reading and writing (authoring), imagining and dreaming, interpretations of nature, talk and texts, and other incoming available affordances.

I will now leave belles-lettres, and later return to this domain in section 8. Right now want to turn to scholarly studies of activities of *reading* as (internal) dialogue. Sarah Trasmundi (2022; Trasmundi, Kukkonen 2024) argues that reading, which of course can occur in different "ecologies" or genres, is meaning-making at large and therefore much more than decoding doodles on paper as symbols standing for linguistic surface expressions. Trasmundi is interested mainly in silent reading, which is not only an information-transfer from text to meaning.

When human reader ascribes meaning to text, it is not matter of dialogue between the reader and the text. The text is not partner in dialogue, because it lacks agency of its own. (At most, one can talk about metaphorical "dialogue" between author and reader). Readers must engage in process of internal dialogue, in which interpretations of the text (perhaps intended by the author) are played out against (parts of) the reader´prior knowledge and present positions. Trasmundi suggests that this process elicits frequent breaks (or pausing) in the reader´direct contact with, and decoding of, the text.

When dealing with reading, it seems important to distinguish between *silent and loud (public) reading*. Under certain (exceptional) circumstances, especially when the reader works with language in which (s)he has only fragmentary knowledge. People who are professional singers often know how to recite perfectly without being able to retrieve to meaning. This comes closer to the decoding view (see above). However, it seems that wider knowledge of meanings in the foreign language text regularly improves the recital in such cases. After all, reading aloud is about the externalisation of the text, and it is advantageous to understand aspects of its meaning.

There is fair amount of evidence that readers use saccades ahead to get some support for their meaning-making. This kind of anticipation surfaces also in experiments with subjects whose task has been set to read text aloud. Studies of eye movements by Järvilehto et al. (2011) during reading conditioned in this way revealed how readers use swift gazes (saccades) that anticipate what will be read aloud in short moment. The experimenters studied the temporal relation between fixation and reading aloud, and they found that subjects in reading practices exploit verbal patterns and textual features coming up later in the text than where they (the subjects) are at the moment in their reading aloud. Thus, they found that reading text is not simply an information process; instead, readers use anticipatory meaning generation (ibid., 15), making sense that help them to understand what they are just about to pronounce.

7.1. MISHEARINGS

At this point, will use case of mishearing as further evidence for internal, perhaps automated perception. We will identify feature of dialogue between explicit talk and abstract linguistic knowledge in way that is partly reminiscent of the anticipation in reading (section 7).

The following mishearing concerns an event with myself sitting on bus in my home town. There is loudspeaker announcing the upcoming stops. Often, it is difficult to hear everything said, especially if you are slightly hard-of-hearing (Linell 2015):

(4) *In this moment the loudspeaker says* nästa Bergfotsgatan *("next stop: Bergfotsgatan"; literally "bergfot street"). However, misheard the digital voice as saying* nästa Vargfotsgatan *("next stop: Vargfotsgatan"; literally "vargfot street"). It is clear that there is mishearing involved; there is indeed street named* Bergfotsgatan *in the vicinity, but no* Vargfotsgatan*. Yet, the mishearing is interesting in several respects. Let me first point out that both street-names are compounds with the lexical item* fot *("foot in Swedish) as the second and last segment; hence,* bergfot *"foot of the mountain" and* vargfot *"wolf´-foot". In* bergfot *there is an initial compound segment* berg *meaning "mountain"). However, the street-name actually pronounced, the one beginning with the compound* berg-fot*, is not natural word in Swedish; it is possible to say* foten på berget *"the foot of the mountain", prepositional phrase, but hardly* bergfot*, compound which is perfectly comprehensible but hardly culturally conventional. By way of contrast,* vargfot *is possible word (but perhaps not so predictable in the region from which the data were picked up). Yet, am certain that heard* Vargfotsgatan*, especially since the mishearing was iterated, when the loudspeaker message was repeated.*

The really interesting aspect of the mishearing in (4) is, however, that repeatedly heard varg *before* berg was said. This seems to imply that the following context (fot, possible continuation after varg but not after berg) is somehow anticipated before it can have been pronounced. Although data like (4) are probably rare, the case indicates that anticipations of continuations are possible not only in reading and speaking, but also in listening. The anticipation in (4) corresponds to possible sequel to what is heard, but this anticipated sequel must somehow be produced in an internal process which is not accessible to introspection.

8. PERSPECTIVES ASCRIBED TO PRINTED TEXTS

If people have access to *written or printed texts*, number of potential relations between different uses and versions become possible. Administrative, legal, pedagogical, and literate texts, plus private texts, e.g., mailed letters, are but few types or genres. Let us recall number of real or recorded activities related to only one general category, namely novels, printed books which appeared in the 18th

and more opulently in the 19th century in the West. Novels are narratives, often fictive, about people´doings and intrigues, even if this type has probably become slightly less obligatory in 20th century postmodernism.

Marková (2006) talks about the Inner Alter(s), which are the main characters´ experiences, assumptions and imaginations of the knowledge and feelings of relevant others. These internal events are obviously somehow parasitic on what the others in question have been observed to say or do. But we ought to distinguish between observations of others, imaginations (perhaps prejudices) about *their* deeds, feelings, plans, etc. On top of all this, we find the author´contributions, not always easy to distinguish from the events of the character(s) and their lives as narrated.

Marková (2021) tells us (that) "[h]umans communicate not only with external others, but they also carry out internal dialogues with themselves and their own ideas, doubting and assuring their correctness." (43). Self´versions of others´ prior (or implicit) contributions may be exact copies of the originals, but they may also be reformulated when integrated in the internal dialogue.classical case, with central place in literary branches of dialogism is Fjodor Dostojevskij´*Crime and Punishment*, which was analysed at several levels by Mikhail Bakhtin (1984). In reading this novel, we are faced with at least the main characters and the author, and their internal and external dialogues. On top of these sources of sense-making comes fourth sense-maker, namely the reader(s), into the whirls of the literary text. The readers are many, and they may come up with divergent interpretations; they are multitude of *different*, and mutually opposed, sense-makers. As if this was not enough, we also have all the persons who have heard readers talk about the book, and made their own modified versions of the book, its author, characters, and the genuine readers, professional critics and historians of literature, etc. All of these sense-makers are primarily involved in internal dialogues, in which they create versions of what other relevant persons have done or said, or could have said.

In Dostojevskij´world we encounter multitude of different "voices" and perspectives, utterances and internal dialogues, formulated by the author or his protagonists. In his *Crime and Punishment*, the main character, Raskolnikov, vacillates constantly between radically different stances both in his own internal dialogues about his doings which include his versions of others´ opinions, and in his external conversations with others. The main topic is: is he guilty or not of two murders? In the internal dialogue of Raskolnikov´mind, there is an almost perpetual and incessant interplay of different opinions, convictions, doubts, arguments, etc., most of which related to the hideous murders at the beginning of the story. Actants and versions of topics constitute different voices in the discourse about Dostojevskij´work. In the individual minds, voices are invoked, whether the individual self would agree with them or he is opposed. In Dostojevskij´*The Brothers Karamazov* all three brothers are constantly

anxiety-ridden by arguments for and against different actions and reactions.

Novels involve internal dialogues between interpretations of topics (as provided by self and others) and self´knowledge and positions (as responsive to what happens in the present occurrent readings). It is easy to exemplify the world of voices around almost any literary work of high quality. Think of the classical book of Homer´*Odysseus*, with the main character experiencing others´ view-points and reactions he is confronted with during his Odyssey, and at the end of his long journey, when returning to Ithaca. We could also choose to look at the modern *Ulysses* (James Joyce, 1921), with its complex intrigues involving Stephen Dedalus, Leonard Bloom, and Mrs Bloom. In Thomas Mann´(2007) masterpiece *Doktor Faustus* we meet at least three main sense-makers, the author himself, whose comments are not easy to sort out from his Alter Ego Serenus Zeitblom, and the composer Adrian Levertün, who makes the contract with the Devil.

Of course, many persons in real life have had difficulties to separate different sides of their existence from each other. Julian Barnes (2016) has written dialogical account of Dmitri Sjostakovitj´life. The main character seems to have succeeded to uphold two versions of himself throughout his life, that of the great composer and that of being credible member of the Communist Party.

Obviously, the nature of internal dialogue varies considerably. There is variation: (a) between genres, (b) variations in the lapse of time, (c) the rate of occurrence of linguistic ingredients (as opposed to non- or pre-linguistic ones), (d) the role of technologies, and (e) the distinction between habitual, automatized vs. goal-directed, planned processes, such as word-searches.

Just before the summary, let me end up with rather different example, this time from the esthetic domain. The famous Estonian composer Arvo Pärt explicates his own music ideal in connection with concert on television:

(5) (Approximate transcript of televised interview with Arvo Pärt)

It is not finished when the music stops. It continues into the silence, there is line right through it. It´full of feelings and experience. There is vertical line, and there is horizontal line. And these two lines create space to walk through. Draw out the lines, and then compress them.

By way of summary, authoring can involve describing things in nature (or artefacts), own or others´ prior discourse, which the subject can apperceive, cognise, evaluate and respond to at the moment, and all this may merge with aspects of self´knowledge and positions. These complicated processes can thus involve interpretations of accessible phenomena (things and discourse) and descriptions or argumentations brought into languaging, perhaps written text. These matters are dubbed "authoring as dialogue" by Holquist (1990, ch. 6). Authoring can of course also involve *imagining* (silent or aloud) plus description of the imagined or dreamt worlds.

Activities involving the understanding of objective environments, other people, their utterances or texts, etc. are not about directly registering inputs or "information". Many cases of internal dialogue revolves around interpretations of inputs and relating the results of this to self´own knowledge and positions, and then of "bringing this into language". The concept of "bringing something into language" leads to questioning the distinction between languaging (and language), on the one hand, and practical action and implied communication (see section 3). It is not simple symbol transition, but process, far from "innocent" (ignorable); it has considerable effects on what meanings are bestowed on the understanding of the slices of the world under interpretation.

9. DECISION-MAKING

Despite the fact that we often believe, at least when important values are at stake, that we choose among number of alternate choices that we are aware of and think about as well-defined. Suppose, for example, if we need to buy new car, and we might choose, say, between Volvo or Toyota. Suppose that we have made list of relevant conditions, and on the basis of this, we go for one alternative. There might seem to be rational calculation behind the decision, just like how an intelligent computer program might "reason". But, over time and deep down, we might have thought about many other aspects, and we have gut feeling of how to decide. How was that final decision made, at its very end with its ideas, expectations, interests, affects, desires, etc?

Computers work with formally defined conditions, all of which have been brought into algorithmic language and appear to be exact and determinate. Human beings, by contrast, make sense in their mundane situations, struggling with meanings and understandings in complex forms and in contexts with their often unclear margins, suspicions, and unconscious hunches (Gurwitsch 1942). This requires both dynamic changes and concreteness, vagueness, ambiguity, indeterminacy, unpredictability and approximations, feelings, cultural norms, intuitions and experiences. Such conditions characterise conversations and other genres of languaging in talk and text, arguments, perception of the environment, thinking, remembering, and imagination, judgments, estimations, values and moralities in everyday life. Decision-making in real life belongs here too; sometimes it is unaided by technology, at other times it is made dependent on technology. Think, for example, of how decisions seem to be made when interviewees are asked which party they plan to vote for in an upcoming election.

10. DISPENSING WITH BRINGING INTO EXPLICIT LANGUAGING

All the prior sections have dealt with the process of going from state outside language into bringing aspects into

language. Let me dwell for brief moment on the possibilities of bringing things out of languaging into inhibition of spoken languaging. For example, one might impede the enlanguaged apperception of something elicited from the external environment, such as the final outcome of the walnut incident (§ 2). Or think of the frequent cases in which people, for various reasons, inhibit responses to speaker´prior contribution. In both these cases, the perceivers or respondents tend to react internally, in the way of having sudden emotions (which will possibly be concealed) or desires to protest (or agree) directly (overt responses are inhibited). These cases may involve internal voices (which are subdued) or no internal enlanguaging (which does not result in spoken languaging). We are obviously confronted with inhibitions of socially presented cases of enlanguaging.

Another point relates to the fact that particular utterances may have specific explicit content, but they may also involve implicit aspects, which may not even have been brought into language before. Consider case like the following short excerpt from an authentic Swedish police interrogation, in which person is accused of having committed the offence of shop-lifting:

(5) DIDN´T PASS THE CASHPOINT: This excerpt appears well into the police interrogation between police inspector (P) and suspect (S), man in his late 30´ (P8: Jönsson 1988). The topic of shop-shifting has been brought up earlier in the interview. P = police inspector. The suspect is accused of having left supermarket without paying for tin of preserved ham, which he had put up in one of his sleeves. He paid for some other goods in his customer basket:

```
1. P: […] an´you had tin of ham inside your jacket [(.)uh
2. S:                                          [˚yea˚
3. P:    mm that´what happened, isn´t [it?
4. S:    (0.5)                        [didn´t pass the
5.       cashpoint.
6. P:    [you didn´t?
7. S:    [(1.8) no:.
8.       (4.0)
9. P:    now there is note in the report, but that´false
10.      then?
11. S:   (0.9) yes. didn´t pass the cashpoint.(.)
12. P:   why did you put this ham tin inside eh the jacket
13.      then?
14. S:   ˚well˚ that can´t explain *properly* (0.8) `cause
15.      had got money an´everything an´eh (…)
16:      it´in indeed right to do so if one doesn´t pass
17.      the cashpoint.[1.2) that´it
18.                    [mm
19. P:   now (.) yeah, that´entirely [correct. now there is
20. S:                               [˚(x)˚
21. P:   witness to this who says that you did pass the
22       cashpoint (.)
23. S:   well, am not lying to you. (…) didn´t pass the
24.      cashpoint. (.)
```

((the interview continues, the suspect claims that he awaited the police to arrive, and that he paid for the tin, and that he had no intention to steal it))

This episode is *mistrust sequence*, in which the police officer indicates that he does not believe the suspect, when the latter denies that he did not pass. the cashpoint. P displays his mistrust, not by claiming that the suspect is lying, yet the latter makes such an interpretation (line 23). What P does do is to issue couple of expressions (lines 9-10, 19-22) occasioned by the suspect´denial of guilt. (There are more cases of this type elsewhere in the interview, which have been omitted in this text.)

An iterated message by the suspect in (6) is his claim "didn´t pass the cashpoint", which is repeated several times (lines 4-5, 16-17, 23-24) (and more cases are omitted here), well after he has confirmed that he had put the ham tin up his jacket sleeve. This action might lead to the conclusion that he was in fact on his way of admitting the petty theft. But the crucial point is that the suspect insists on *not* having passed the cashpoint, which would have completed the offence of shop-lifting. In (6) he has not yet confessed an offence (cf. his argument in lines 15-17). However, later on (not shown here) he does give in, when the police arrives to the supermarket. Yet, in his perspective, the accusation of (petty) theft is mitigated by the fact that he had the money to pay for the tin and all the other goods that he had openly deposited in his shopping trolley.

What is the point of all this for the present paper? Our focus is first and foremost on the role of the key utterance "didn´t pass the cashpoint". This is an explicit description of something rather clearly made known, something which is clearly relevant in the activity type of police interview. It deals with what the suspect did at the cashpoint, or rather did *not* do. The point is that the utterance does more than telling what is said in explicit verbal terms. In addition, the utterance brings along number of associations of central relevance for the purpose of the particular situation, the police interrogation, namely, if the suspect is guilty, or not guilty, of petty offence, that is, so-called shop-lifting. It is highly probable that this is tacitly present in the minds of both parties.

We can also see that our iterated key utterance fulfils its hidden functions by the characteristic relations to prior and possibly future utterances and actions. Messages in interaction are typically interdependent with these "surplus meanings" that rely on meanings which are not locally fully explicit, but which are arguably present as inferences in participants´ internal dialogues. The key utterance ("didn´t pass the cashpoint") is arguably, when it occurs for the first time (line 4) in (6), not about what has been made explicit locally (lines 1, 3). It is via retrospective and prospective links, i.e., flashbacks to memories and anticipations of imminent future conclusions, that an extra "surplus" of sense-making is accomplished in the internal dialogue, In Bakhtin´(1981) lingo, we are concerned with things "already said" (retrospective links) and things "not yet said" (anticipations).

11. FINAL DISCUSSION

In general summing up, find that there are three issues to discuss, the noema of internal dialogue, the concept of bringing something into languaging, and finally some aspects of Merleau-Ponty´phenomenology. will begin with internal dialogue, and end up in phenomenology.

How can *internal dialogue* be explicated? Well, it is clearly notion that tries to mirror the more well-known phenomenon of `external dialogue´. Like external dialogue, the internal one is an interaction between two (or more) sense-making positions. But would not draw the parallel too far. will sketch internal dialogue[9] in less precise manner, as *dynamic interplay* which takes place between *language fragments* (chunks; they are not always full clauses or sentences) against the (back)ground of *horizon*, or marginal field, of *non-linguistic features and processes*, such as visual images, touches, feelings and excitations. Internal dialogues thrive on embryos leading to the bringing into languaging and language.

Internal dialogue is often preparatory stage before the "externalisation" into external social dialogue. However, the internal dialogues vary in character across the ecologies and genres sketched above. For example, they vary in the extents to which languaging is involved, or whether the whole process results in externalisation.[10]

Among my major interests is how people decide on what to say in given situation or how to ascribe meaning to text move from indeterminacy to explicitness, which both seem to revolve around the notion of internal dialogue. Explicitness is not always decisive in determining the products. It captures only the discourse, that is, talk or text, not secret aspects that speakers don´t want to disclose for the moment. This applies both to earlier experiences in prior situations, memories, things which may have "already been said", and to unspoken (but realised) anticipations ("things not yet said", "tacit meanings not said, or perhaps not even sayable, explicitly"). In other words, explicitness is often given too much weight in linguists´ analyses. Recalls and anticipations are important as surroundings of key utterances. When formulating (spoken or written) comments to text, an activity quite common in scholarly writing, we often add to the target text new material and ideas, i.e. more text, via internal and external dialogue.

Bringing into languaging (or language) is clearly dialogical activity. There is the internal aspect, when fragments of language are met with aspects of non-linguistic horizons. But we have also seen that activities in which internal dialogue functions contributes in various fashions, either in the perspective of an individual, or socially in an external dialogue. These processes can occur in activities, such as thinking, interacting and conversing, writing, reading, dreaming, imagining, etc. Several

semiotic resources (words, images, gut feelings, emotional expressions, etc.) are used in connection with the processes of enlanguaging. Explorative studies, such as some of those presented above, show how intertwined activities like perception, practical action, speaking, understanding, etc. are.

The late French philosopher and phenomenologist *Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (d. 1961) launched theoretical position in which speaking and multimodal gestures precede and thereby, later in acquisition, make languaging and language possible. Merleau-Ponty builds his theory on gestures and actions as contained in languaging, rather than abstract `signs´ as in formal linguistics. Occasioned and explicit expressions often indicate that what is made explicit in them is often linked to *tacit meanings not said explicitly*. typical passage in Merleau-Ponty (1962, 183) says that "[w]hat communicate with primarily is not `representations´ or thought". Instead, communication consists in showing up as "speaking subject with certain style of being" but speaking subject, with certain style of being and with the world at which he directs his aim."

Phenomenology is concerned with how people actually behave in the social world and in real interactions with others and the environment. It is concerned with how people shift their perspectives and thus understand more aspects of the external world. [11] It also tries to describe and explain mental processes that are socially anchored in the real world, but often only partially explicitly and only partially consciously. We would argue that explicitness (verbal formulation) has been overstated in theories of mind. In fact, human beings have to deal with indeterminacies, vagueness, ambiguities, implicitness, context-dependencies, etc. This is true of perception, cognition, remembering, imagination, evaluation, choices among alternatives, etc. (Linell, Boström 2024). For example, the task to choose one option in complex situation is often presented as the selection of one determinate alternative, when it is actually presented in situation where many aspects are, or have been, at play.

Problems of *"knowing what one is going to say"* and its origins in partly vague circumstances were argued already in Linell (1979). Indeed, this rather premature publication shares many aspects with this text (from 2023), but there is at least one important divergence. In Linell (1979) the process from indeterminacy and vagueness to explicitness, i.e., verbalisation for communication, or thinking for speaking (section 5), was discussed as an exclusively individual process in the single person´mind. Therefore, the 1979 paper was not more psycho-linguistic than really phenomenological (cf. n. 9).

Modern phenomenology is mainly anchored in data from the social life in the community. Of course, phenomenological analyses are often based on internal, and

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9 There are of course outdated labels like `thoughts´ (before, often seen as `complete thoughts´) or `inner speech´ (Merleau-Ponty´own term).

10 The relation between perception and sense-making and their externalisation in social interaction (bringing the content into external dialogue) has been discussed by Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1973) at length.

11 See n. 4.

hence individual processes. In accordance with dialogism (n. 1), we have to look at meanings and understandings which originally, usually indirectly, have been made possible by internalised experiences, from interactions with other people in divergent cultural situations. In these situations there are contributions by several individuals; some are very experienced, others are novices making new discoveries and inventing modified ways of bringing experiences into languaging. These social aspects were downplayed in my old paper. Individual and socially shared experiences are kinds of memories, some salient, others vague and in need of restructuring.

It would be illuminating if these basically social processes could be accessed and identified as neurophysiological processes. However, neuro-scientists must abandon their common assumption that it is the neurological processes and structures that *are* the true reality of languaging. In my view these matters should be seen primarily and "only" as the corporeal contributions to meanings and understandings of experiences which are detected, developed and sediment in the social, phenomenal world. Mainstream trends in cognitive science have taken for granted that models of internal mental processes must be based on well-defined ideas, units, "representations" and rules, based on logical principles (e.g. Pagin 1982) and formal deductions (Chomsky, 1995). This is not in accordance with how human existence is produced and experienced.

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